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The Future of the Witness:  
Nature, Race and More-than-Human Environmental Publics  
 





In a 2014 article entitled ‘Ecology, Race, and the Making of Environmental Publics: A 
Dialogue with Silent Spring in South Africa’, anthropologist Lesley Green identifies 
obstacles to the creation of an ‘environmental public’ in contemporary post-apartheid 
South Africa. 1  The broader backdrop against which Green writes – one that is 
experienced globally to differing degrees and in often distinct manners – is that of 
environmental violence that is enacted both against racialized human bodies and against 
nature, and with this the entanglement between abuses of human and nonhuman rights. 
For a start, violations of human rights, both in South Africa and beyond, have been and 
continue to often be carried out through the natural environment, for instance through 
scorched earth tactics, environmental remodelling, planting, the creation of enclosures 
and dispossession through land-grabbing.2 Moreover, in the context of ‘environmental 
                                                
*I am grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on an earlier 
version of this article. 
 
1 Lesley Green, ‘Ecology, Race, and the Making of Environmental Publics: A Dialogue with 
Silent Spring in South Africa’, Resilience: A Journal of the Environmental Humanities, vol. 1, no. 2 (June 
2014), unpaginated, p. 5. [Note to copyeditor: page numbers from a printed copy are included for 
the sake of reference but maybe they should be deleted entirely?] As suggested by the title, 
Green’s article is a reading of Rachel Carson’s seminal 1962 book, Silent Spring, in the context of 
contemporary environmental debate in South Africa.  
2 In the South African context, the planting of a wild almond tree hedge around the 
Kirstenbosch National Botanical Gardens in Cape Town is a prime example. In the words of 
Uriel Orlow, ‘the planting of [this hedge] to protect the fruit and vegetables from the grazing 
cattle of the KhoiKhoi can be considered as one of the first acts of violence against the 
indigenous population.’ Uriel Orlow, ‘Preface: Beautiful, But Dangerous’ in Shela Sheikh and 
Uriel Orlow, eds., Uriel Orlow: Theatrum Botanicum (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2018), 21–23; see also 
Melanie Boehi, ‘Multispecies Histories of South African Imperial Formations in the Kirstenbosch 
National Botanical Garden’ in Theatrum Botanicum, 81–87, esp. 84.  
Regarding scorched earth tactics and accompanying attempts to criminalize ecocide, see 
Paulo Tavares, ‘The Geopolitical Imperative: On the Political Ecology of the Amazonia’s Deep 
History’ in Etienne Turpin, ed., Architecture in the Anthropopocene: Encounters Among Design, Deep 
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racism’, such violations are often enacted against racialized populations who are 
culturally and politically rendered ‘disposable’ or ‘sacrificeable’ – for instance climate 
refugees or, in the case of contemporary South Africa, those denied access to water, 
exposed to higher levels of pollution and/or toxicity or removed from their land in the 
name of the profitability of extractive capitalism, for instance mining – or, in a more 
sinister move, removed from their land in the name of conservation.3  
 
In the case of nature, Green speaks of the ‘political silence […] of creatures and 
landforms that we call “nature”’.4 Here, in what will be one of the key gestures that that 
this article sets outs to examine in relation to the condition of ‘missingness’, nature is 
treated as an object, ‘a resource without voice or rights’.5 Moreover, it is treated as an object 
that needs to be protected by humans, but only certain kinds of humans: for instance, as 
Green relates, in the context of the ‘tragedies’ of ‘compliance-based environmental 
management’ in South Africa, nature, so the dominant story goes, needs to be protected 
by the government from those who supposedly have no right to it (for example, 
poachers or Asian syndicates) for those who ‘do’ have the rights to it (for instance, quota 
holders and conservation scientists). This question of who is entitled to, or ought to, speak 
in the name of whom will be one of my key concerns in what follows – above all in the 
context of silencing and missingness, as well as constructed categories of active/passive, 
subject/object as these play out across race, nature and shifting conceptions of the 
human. In the context of South Africa, Green writes, who has the right to advocate for 
nature is ‘profoundly racialized, since voices raised in the protection of nature have an 
uneasy time escaping the scripts of race and racism.’6 Key here is the subject/object 
                                                                                                                                      
Time, Science and Philosophy (Ann Arbour: Open Humanities Press, 2013), 209–39, esp. 229–31; and 
Hannah Meszaros-Martin, ‘Defoliating the World: Ecocide, Visual Evidence and “Earthly 
Memory”, Third Text, 32 (2–3) (Spring 2018): 230–53.  
Regarding violence enacted through the environment, see Ros Gray and Shela Sheikh, ‘The 
Wretched Earth: Botanical Conflicts and Artistic Interventions – Introduction’, Third Text 151, 
32, 2 (Spring 2018), 163–75, at 164; Uriel Orlow and Shela Sheikh, ‘Introduction: A Prisoner in 
the Garden’ in Theatrum Botanicum, 25–39, esp. 28. 
3 Regarding this ‘disposability’ and ‘sacrificeability’, see Judith Butler, Frames of War: When Is Life 
Grievable? (London: Verso, 2010); Naomi Klein, ‘Let Them Drown: The Violence of Othering in 
a Warming World,’ London Review of Books, 38, 11 (2 June 2016), 
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v38/n11/naomi-klein/let-them-drown. Regarding environmental racism, 
see Françoise Vergès, ‘Racial Capitalocene: Is the Anthropocene Racial?’, Verso Blog, 30 August 
2017, https://www. versobooks.com/blogs/ 3376-racial-capitalocene. 
4 Green, ‘Environmental Publics’, 1. 
5 Green, ‘Environmental Publics’, 3, emphasis added. 
6 Green, ‘Environmental Publics’, 2. Otherwise put, ‘[i]n a context in which conservation is 
increasingly implemented at the point of a gun or at least at the point of booms that open only to 
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relation that, as I will come to, must be read through the legacy of colonial 
categorisations of forms of life. As Green writes: ‘The violence that is racism […] finds 
its power in the classification of some as subjects, who have the right to speak, and 
others who are silent. The silenced are but objects or things in the racial imaginary in 
which people are reduced to the non-human; classed as a lesser species.’7 In other words, 
classed as closer to ‘nature’.8 
 
In the context of this special issue on the theme of ‘Missing and Missed: The subject, 
politics and memorialisation of South Africa’s colonial and apartheid dead’, my 
contribution may at first appear somewhat oblique. For a start, beyond my reference to 
Green’s article, I write neither from South Africa nor of its colonial or apartheid history 
and legacies. Rather, as do many of the contributors, I respond here to the aim of both 
the special issue and the workshop that preceded it to take insights from the uniqueness 
of the status of ‘missingness’ in the South African context and to engage with a multitude 
of geopolitical settings.9 (My reading will move between the European Holocaust to 
global humanitarian and forensic practices, through largely European and North 
American science and technology studies and later Amerindian thinking in the Andes in 
order to gather together a more generalised set of questions and propositions.) I take 
Green’s analysis of the specificity of environmental publics in the South African context 
as a provocation to think through a specific kind of ‘missing figure’ on a global scale: that 
of the witness, albeit in an expanded sense.  
 
 
The witness as missing figure  
The missing figure to whom or which I refer here is not the missing witness as the object 
of past colonial or apartheid violence – the figure who has been stripped, precisely, of 
                                                                                                                                      
paying elites, the legacy of racism spills out like oil from a sunken ship’ (2). Green speaks of the 
exorbitant cost of entry to South Africa’s national parks, which excludes racialized sections of the 
population.  
7 Green, ‘Environmental Publics’. On the classification, along racial lines, of people as ‘less-than-
human’ and ‘not-quite-human’, see Alexander G Weheliye, Habeas Viscus: Racializing Assemblages, 
Biopolitics, and Black Feminist Theories of the Human (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014). 
8 This is particularly the case for indigenous populations in settler colonial contexts.  
9 I refer here to the workshop, under the same title, which took place at the Centre for 
Humanities Research, University of Western Cape, on 27 February–1 March 2018. 
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their status as subject or person, dehumanised and disappeared (i.e., been made missing),10 
and who is thus no longer able to speak and testify to their fate, be this to the legal court 
or to the court of public opinion or history. Nor is this the witness figure as the survivor 
(the witness as superstes) or onlooker (the witness as third party or testis) who gives 
testimony to public, quasi-legal hearings – for instance, the South African Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission; but global examples abound – about what took place.11 
Rather, responding to both Green’s reading of contemporary environmental publics and 
to the broader escalation of environmental violence on a global scale, the missing figure 
here designates the very manner in which we conceive of the witness, ontologically 
(across various forms of life and temporalities), epistemologically and politically. Read 
through the grammar of the double genitive, my title, ‘the future of the witness’, is 
intended to provoke two questions: in what ways must we re-conceptualise and expand 
our understanding of ‘the witness’ as we move into the future; and is it possible for a 
witness to testify both to present and future experiences – to the very future of life on 
this planet that is threatened through the ever-exacerbating Anthropocenic 
environmental violence that I have begun to outline above?12 As such, witnessing in this 
context is not the act of bearing witness (testifying), in the present, to an event that took 
place (was witnessed or experienced) in the past, at a determined moment; rather, unlike 
the classical conception of testimony in which the ‘thing’ experienced is no longer 
present to the witness and as such is recalled through memory, witnessing is here 
                                                
10 To this missingness we can add what Jenny Edkins names ‘unmissing’, as in as in simply not 
noticed, at least by some, as missing. Jenny Edkins, Missing: Persons and Politics (Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press, 2011), 5. 
11 These figures have been amply documented and engaged with by scholars embedded in the 
South African context, for instance from the perspectives of history, literary theory, philosophy, 
and law, to name but a few, and in the work done in the Forensic History Project based in the 
History Department at the University of Western Cape.  
The word ‘witness’ has two roots in Latin (and, as Emile Benveniste shows, in all Indo-
European languages): on the one hand, testis, someone who was present as a third party (from 
terstis) at a transaction where two persons are concerned; and superstes, someone who ‘exists 
beyond’ the event, who experienced it and survived it in order to subsequently bear witness. 
Émile Benveniste, Indo-European Language and Society (London: Faber, 1973 [1969]). See Didier 
Fassin, Humanitarian Reason: A Moral History of the Present, trans. Rachel Gomme (Berkeley, Los 
Angeles and London: University of California Press, 2012), 204; Sybille Krämer and Sigrid 
Weigel, ‘Introduction: Converging the Yet-Separate Theoretical Discourses of Testimony Studies’ 
in Testimony/Bearing Witness: Epistemology, Ethics, History and Culture (Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), 
ix–xli, at xi; and Jacques Derrida, ‘Poetics and Politics of Witnessing’, in Sovereignties in Question: 
The Poetics of Paul Celan, eds. Thomas Dutoit & Outi Pasanen (New York: Fordham University 
Press, 2005), 65–86, at 73–74. 
12 The term Anthropocene designates the ‘human dominance of biological, chemical and 
geological processes on Earth’. See Paul J. Crutzen and Eugene F. Stoermer, ‘The 
“Anthropocene”’, International Geosphere-Biosphere Programme 41 (2000).  
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conceived of as an ongoing process that entails the simultaneous registration of 
experiences (witnessing) and representation (bearing witness) to a public – as an 
accumulation of grievances in the context of environmental degradation and the 
subjugation of certain ‘subjects’ (be these human or non-human).13 
 
My argument is that, where what is demanded is collective action and responses insofar 
as singular lives are violated within broader ecologies, the witness can no longer be a 
solitary figure; rather, the witness must instead be but one within a collectivity. Moreover, 
it is precisely in the context of a collectivity that the witness figure of which I write is 
constituted and produced. No longer the heroic, autonomous individual, the witness must 
thus be one of many, inscribed within a particular social milieu. As Sybille Krämer and 
Sigrid Weigel stress, despite the lack of agreement regarding concepts of and approaches 
towards testimony, there is at least one ‘fundamental consensus’: that testimony cannot 
be determined outside of a ‘testimony constellation’ or ‘social constellation’; 
‘“testimony”/“bearing witness” is a relational concept […] an intersubjective situation in 
a historically specific social world that is condensed in the act of testifying.’14 
 
Furthermore, although the figure of the witness has traditionally been confined to the 
human (in particular in the legal realm), I argue that where what is at stake is care for 
both human and more-than-human life,15 witness collectivities need necessarily entail an 
expansion beyond the category of the human. Green argues for an environmentality that 
does not take recourse to modernist categories of subject and object – i.e., the 
categorisation that I began to sketch out above that forms the basis of the construction 
of both ‘humanity’ and ‘nature’, as well as race, as I will come to.16 In other words, for an 
environmental public that entails more-than-humans. What I propose is that we extend 
Green’s thesis and conceive of the figures that constitute such a public more specifically 
as active witnesses, across the human/nonhuman divide, to both present unfolding 
environmental degradation and possible more liveable futures. What I take from Green’s 
                                                
13 For a reading of the conventional temporal and sense-perceptual schema of 
witnessing/testimony, see Derrida, ‘Poetics and Politics of Witnessing’, 77.  
14 Krämer and Weigel, ‘Introduction’, x.  
15 I use the term ‘more-than-human’ throughout in lieu of ‘nonhuman’, which defines everything 
other than human in relation to the human. Also, as per Anna Tsing’s use of the term, this is to 
designate the entanglement between humans and other-than-humans. See Anna Tsing, The 
Mushroom at the End of the World: On the Possibility of Life in Capitalist Ruins (Princeton and Oxford: 
Princeton University Press, 2015). 
16 Green, ‘Environmental Publics’, 8, 9.  
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reading of the South African context is the need to surpass the argument around the 
naturalization of race as a social construct (for instance, in the exotic othering of 
indigenous peoples, whose representations, from without, place them closer to nature; or 
the rendering ‘disposable’ of racialized populations merely through a cultural imaginary) 
and to instead address both race and nature concomitantly in the modernist imaginary, 
precisely through the manner in which the subject/object divide allows us to think 
through both racism and the war on nature. Green turns to the constitution writers of 
contemporary Ecuador and Bolivia who, by including nature as bearer of legal rights in 
2008, ‘have extended their critique of modernist thought to reject the subject-object 
divide that legitimates a war on nature’, and ‘are attempting to constitute an 
environmentality that draws on a different intellectual heritage – one that is deeply bound 
up in Amerindian thought.’17 While Green’s move is to bring into conversation the South 
African post-apartheid experiment with that of Latin American decoloniality (which I 
will turn to below), I would like to suggest that these two ‘experiments’ offer much when 
we rephrase environmental publics through the language of witnessing, especially when 
conceived in terms of subject and object and, as I am coming to, classical and persistent 
postcolonial questions of representation.  
 
To be clear, I am not the first to propose that the figure of the witness be extended 
beyond the human; I take leave from a range of re-conceptualisations of the more-than-
human witness in order to frame these in the context of witnessing collectivities, and to 
then focus on some specific questions around missingness and representation that I 
argue require pursuing further. As such, what follows contributes to an as yet dispersed 
field that traverses multiple disciplines and geographical locations. In the legal context, 
practices and theorisations of nonhuman rights or the rights of nature – and with this 
shifting categories of personhood, legal standing and voice – have done much to 
acknowledge nature as ‘a fundamental space to which cultural and political rights are 
bound’ and to make ‘ecological systems inhabit the courtrooms of national and 
transnational forums as potential witnesses of legal violations.’ 18  There are notable 
                                                
17 Green, ‘Environmental Publics’, 8. 
18 Paulo Tavares, ‘Nonhuman Rights’ in Forensic Architecture, ed., Forensis: The Architecture of 
Public Truth (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2014), 553–72, at 562. The literature on the rights of nature 
is vast. For a useful overview, see also TJ Demos, ‘Rights of Nature: The Art and Politics of 
Earth Jurisprudence’, April 2015, https://cpb-us-
e1.wpmucdn.com/sites.ucsc.edu/dist/0/196/files/2015/10/Demos-Rights-of-Nature-
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further examples of expanding the category of the witness beyond the ‘human’. For 
instance, deconstruction (notably in the work of Jacques Derrida) had already shown us 
that the irreplaceable, sovereign, autonomous and self-present figure that the witness is 
supposed to be is always already affected by heteronomy and prosthetized by an 
‘originary technicity’, as such exposing the impossibility of ‘pure’, ‘actual’ or ‘authentic’ 
testimony.19 And if human testimony can be seen as always-already quasi-technologised, 
and as such never fully ‘human’ (i.e., pertaining to physis, as opposed to its supposed 
opposite, tekhne), on the seeming other end of the spectrum, technological media itself 
might be considered as witness. Here the work of Susan Schuppli is instructive. Since 
2005, through both art practice and theoretical writings, Schuppli has been developing 
the ‘material witness’: an operative concept that foregrounds the ‘expressive quality’ of 
nonhuman matter and demonstrates ‘how media artefacts and environmental conditions 
themselves bear witness not only to “events” but also the sorting and registration 
processes imposed upon them in order for them to qualify as evidence in the first place’, 
asking ‘how objects become agents of contestation between different stake-holders and 
truth claims’,20 especially in the manner in which they are ‘made to speak’ as technical 
witnesses to crimes. A further significant reference point is the ‘forensic aesthetics’ upon 
which the work of the London-based Forensic Architecture agency, which arose in the 
context of the fallibility of human testimony, is based.21 In the absence of reliable human 
witnesses (i.e., when the witness is missing), forensic aesthetics, to which I will return, 
turns instead to the agency of matter (organic or inorganic, including natural 
environments) or ‘object witnesses’ to question factual reality as expressed by the state.22  
                                                                                                                                      
2015.compressed.pdf; and Rafi Youatt, ‘Personhood and the Rights of Nature: The New 
Subjects of Contemporary Earth Politics’, International Political Sociology, 11, 1 (2017): 1–16. 
19 In other words, the (self-same) ‘presence’ of human speech (for testimony, in theory at least, 
should be proffered ‘live’, in the first person and without any technological recording or 
transmission devices) is only possible on the basis of a quasi-technical reproducibility that for 
Derrida ‘is’ the minimal trace of both communicability and experience per se. Notable texts by 
Derrida on witnessing include: ‘Poetics and Politics of Witnessing’, op cit; Monolingualism of the 
Other; or, The Prosthesis of Origin, trans. Patrick Mensah (Stanford, California: Stanford University 
Press, 1998); Demeure: Fiction and Testimony, trans. Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2000);  Jacques Derrida & Bernard Stiegler, Echographies of Television: 
Filmed Interviews, trans. Jennifer Bajorek (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002).  
20 https://www.forensic-architecture.org/file/material-witness/. 
21 Schuppli was previously Senior Research Fellow and Project Coordinator on the Forensic 
Architecture project (2011–2014). 
22 The group – which is comprised of architects, theorists, lawyers, scientists, programmers, 
artists and filmmakers – gathers and presents spatial analysis in legal and political forums across 
the world, with the aim of using the investigative apparatuses of the state against the state, above 
all in respect to its violations, in chime with the model of nongovernmental politics to which I 
will turn. ‘Architecture’ here is both used in a restricted sense (i.e., buildings, which are viewed as 
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Where the rights of nature and the practice of forensic aesthetics, for example, are 
oriented towards evidentiary and legal forums, the witness-collectivities to which I 
gesture also operate beyond empirical truth claims in the sphere of public opinion more 
broadly. In what follows, I examine the capacity of nature to empirically register and 
express environmental change, as well as taking inspiration from the work of political 
theorist Michal Givoni, whose reading of the specific form of humanitarian witnessing 
practiced by Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF, or Doctors Without Borders) in her book 
The Care of the Witness: A Contemporary History of Testimony in Crisis (2016) provides a 
blueprint for conceiving of witnessing as both a practice of care for the other and of 
political protest that contests contemporary (here neoliberal and, we can add, neo-
colonial and extractive) forms of governmentality.23 However, where Givoni’s witness 
bears witness to humanitarian disaster, I argue for the necessity of moving beyond the 
human.  
 
In considering nature as active participant in environmental publics, I do not propose 
that nature be conceived as witness figure strictly speaking insofar as this would entail 
anthropomorphism (for instance, that nature can bear witness linguistically, or be 
conceived as witness in the framework of trauma studies, memory studies, ethics, affect 
theory or psychoanalysis that are entailed within testimony theory). 24  Rather, my 
argument is that witnesses are produced in the context of more-than-human socialities, 
between the human and nonhuman. In the case of nonhuman life, I question whether 
                                                                                                                                      
documentary forms or sensors), and as a field of knowledge and mode of interpretation, concerned with 
relations between people and things, through spaces and structures, from the human body, 
through buildings and homes to the planet itself, which is proposed as the ultimate home or 
‘construction site’. See https://www.forensic-architecture.org; Thomas Keenan and Eyal 
Weizman, Mengele’s Skull: The Advent of a Forensic Aesthetics (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2012); Eyal 
Weizman, ‘Introduction: Forensis’ in Forensic Architecture, ed., Forensis: The Architecture of Public 
Truth (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2014), 9–32; and Eyal Weizman, Forensic Architecture: Violence at the 
Threshold of Detectability (New York: Zone Books, 2017). Of particular relevance here are the 
group’s investigations into environmental violence; see, for instance, Forensic Architecture in 
collaboration with SITU Research, ‘Case: Guatemala’ in Forensis, 519–52. 
 
23 Michal Givoni, The Care of the Witness: A Contemporary History of Testimony in Crises (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2016). 
24 I take the term ‘vocative moment’ from Green. For useful overviews of these varying 
approaches to testimony theory, see Michal Givoni, The Care of the Witness: A Contemporary History 
of Testimony in Crises (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Sybille Krämer and Sigrid 
Weigel, eds., Testimony/Bearing Witness: Epistemology, Ethics, History and Culture (Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2017). 
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our vocabulary must be expanded beyond the term ‘witness’, with all its anthropocentric 
assumptions.  
 
It is with this risk of anthropocentrism, in particular, that what follows adds a specific 
line of enquiry to existing conceptions of the witness figure beyond the human. While 
the discourse of the rights of nature and its ‘vocative moment’ has been debated in terms 
of the risks entailed in ‘giving voice’ to nature,25 I phrase this here in terms of the 
paradoxical risks entailed in retrieving missing figures. In the context in which the 
witness is missing (i.e., absent and, for some at least, missed), should not a prosthetic or 
proxy testimony be sought? How, then, to grapple with the problematics of ‘speaking 
for’ in lieu of the missing or missed, insofar as this runs the risk of reinforcing an original 
silencing or effacement, for instance through the category of nature or race? Or, in the 
context of environmentalism, when this entails the possibility of nature itself becoming 
the subaltern, deprived of an adequate audience? In other words, in what follows, I wish 
to ‘stay with the trouble’, to use Donna Haraway’s phrase, of the ambiguities and 
potentially productive limitations to witnessing.26 If, as I will explore below, the ‘era of 
the witness’ – a foregrounding of the testimonial narratives of victims that took place 
notably after the trial of Adolph Eichmann trial in 1961 – was paradoxically premised 
upon the troubled performance of testimony (i.e., upon a crisis of testimony),27 I ask 
what the productive ambiguities of both witnessing and representational practices might 
be in an age in which nature – previously overlooked or missed in the modernist 
imaginary, as passive object – is granted both legal rights and expressive capacities.  
 
 
The care of the witness: between ethics and politics  
‘No one / bears witness for the / witness.’28 Such are the oft-quoted words of the poet 
Paul Celan, whose body of work exemplifies the impossibility of testifying to the horrors 
of the Nazi camps.29 This would simultaneously function as an ethical injunction: that 
no-one should bear witness in the place of the witness, that no-one should speak for the 
                                                
25 Critics of the rights of nature ‘include both humanists who are skeptical of the way that 
speaking for nature is a front for other human interests, and posthumanists who worry about the 
re-institution of an anthropocentric politics in the act of “speaking for” nonhumans.’ Rafi 
Youatt, ‘Personhood and the Rights of Nature’, 2. 
26 See Donna Haraway, Staying with the Trouble: Making Kin in the Chthulucene (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2016). 
27 See Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 5. 
28 Paul Celan, ‘Ash Glory [Aschenglorie]’ (1967) 
29 See Derrida, ‘Poetics and Politics of Witnessing’. 
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witness – a quandary that will be central in what follows in relation to nature. And yet, as 
Giorgio Agamben writes, drawing from Primo Levi’s experience of Auschwitz in The 
Drowned and the Saved (1986), the witness as survivor (superstes) does not testify fully, for 
the ‘true’ or ‘complete’ witnesses is the drowned (the ‘Muselmann’), who ‘touched bottom’ 
and for whom no-one can testify.30 In other words, for whom no-one can stand in as a 
third-party witness (testis) or ‘spokesperson’. As Didier Fassin writes, ‘in current usage’, 
the boundary between the figures of superstes and testis ‘is tending to become blurred’.31 
The superstes has come to be supplanted by the testis in manifold ways, most notably 
nowadays, as Eyal Weizman notes, ‘with the development and widespread accessibility of 
digital data derived from activist imagery and their accelerated dissemination via mobile 
phone, cloud, and social networks.’32 Looking back, this shift can be read in tandem with 
the emergence of the humanitarian witness, propelled by the work of Médecins sans 
Frontières, which ‘was born in 1971 out of the refusal to remain silent during the war in 
Biafra’. Thus emerged the witness as testis: ‘not the witness who has experienced the 
tragedy, but the one who has brought aid to its victims.’33 
 
Here I propose that we linger a while with Givoni in order to eventually bring into 
dialogue her thesis regarding ‘the care of the witness’ and the problematics of ‘speaking 
for’ in the context of environmental violence.34 Givoni’s starting point in The Care of the 
Witness is a study of the internal dilemmas and debates regarding humanitarian witnessing 
within Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) that culminated in the publication and 
dissemination of a series of studies entitled ‘Speaking Out’ in 2004. What the series’ 
reflexive elaboration on witnessing, memory and advocacy confirmed was that the 
humanitarian witness was not just a source of eye-witness testimony, but also a character 
to take on, one who pursues outspoken statements to be carefully deliberated within 
                                                
30  ‘The “true” witnesses, the “complete witnesses,” are those who did not bear witness and could 
not bear witness. They are those who “touched bottom”: the Muslims, the drowned. The 
survivors speak in their stead, by proxy, as pseudo-witnesses; they bear witness to a missing 
testimony. […] Whoever assumes the charge of bearing witness in their name knows that he or 
she must bear witness in the name of the impossibility of bearing witness.’ Giorgio Agamben, 
Remnants of Auschwitz: The Witness and the Archive, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (New York: Zone 
Books, 1999), 34.  
31 Fassin, Humanitarian Reason, 205. 
32 Weizman, ‘Introduction: Forensis’, 12. 
33 Fassin, Humanitarian Reason, 205–06. See also Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 2.  
34  Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 4.  
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(largely Western, admittedly) public, political spheres.35 The re-conceptualised task of 
witnessing was premised upon more than simply ‘speaking truth to power’; rather than 
simply seeking to contest power (in particular neoliberal governmentality) it also strove 
to provide acts of care. By drawing from Michel Foucault’s notion of ethics as a 
reflective and socially guided ‘care of the self’,36 through her reading of MSF, Givoni 
argues that the cultivation of the self is not incompatible with a politics that underscores 
the responsibility towards or care for the other.37   
 
Here, the troubled performance of testimony that constituted the ‘era of the witness’ and 
that had been consolidated by the poststructuralist tradition as ‘the tenacious trace of 
humanity in politics’ 38  is combined with a more explicitly activist take: where 
poststructuralist theory had stressed the bankruptcy of ethics to the detriment of the 
political challenges of witnessing, and where more recent studies had focused on the 
political instrumentality of witnessing but neglected the ethical, Givoni identifies in the 
work of MSF a combination of the two. Here, then, is the entrance of the still ethically-
concerned, reflexive witness into the sphere of politics.  
 
While Givoni’s concern is the humanitarian witnessing practiced and developed by MSF, 
her use of Michel Feher’s account of nongovernmental politics and the ‘shared 
determination not to be governed thusly’ 39  has much to offer for the context of 
environmental activism as a means of protesting a mode of governing that is premised 
upon the assumption that individuals best fulfil their political and civic obligations ‘when 
they seek to fulfil themselves as free individuals.’40 Givoni’s aim is to bring into focus the 
interplay between witnessing and the contemporary logic of governing by 
responsibilization: for instance, the transformation of liberal democracies from an 
                                                
35 Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 176. Witnessing and testimony are here gestures that do not just 
produce empirical or metaphysical truths; rather, they ‘are bound to instigate a subjective 
transformation’ (11). 
36 Here Givoni draws from Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure (New York: Vintage Books, 
1990), esp. 25–32; and Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the Collège de 
France, 1981–1982, ed. Frédéric Gros (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). 
37 Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 206, 175ff. 
38 Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 5. Givoni focuses on the figure of the witness in the work of 
Jean-François Lyotard, Giorgio Agamben and Shoshana Felman. 
39 Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 28, 25–26. See Michel Feher, ‘The Governed in Politics’ in 
Michel Feher, Gaëlle Krikorian and Yates McKee, eds., Nongovernmental Politics (New York: Zone 
Books, 2007), 12–27. 
40 Nikolas Rose, Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999), p. 166, cited in Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 24.  
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interventionist apparatus to one in which individuals are propelled to act socially and 
responsibly out of their own initiative. In the context of environmental justice, the point 
has been made repeatedly that, whereas supra-national binding agreements on quotas to 
tackle climate change (and thus reduce numbers of climate refugees), combined with 
adequate state policy, are what is necessary,41 neoliberal governmentality increasingly 
seeks to place responsibility on individuals (often as ‘green consumers’).42 In Givoni’s 
account, witnessing is a means of ‘moral crafting of the self’ that avoids creating ‘anchors 
for neoliberal policy that transfers responsibilization to private individuals in matters 
pertaining to both global and social justice’.43 Witnessing, as practiced by MSF, is a means 
of ‘defying neoliberalism from within’44 that does not simply ‘[denounce] and [lament] 
the personalization of politics as the strategy through which neoliberalism causes people 
to lose sight of their collective interests’; 45  rather, the practice of witnessing as a 
simultaneous cultivation of the self and care for others as an active participation in 
political life allows for strategies of self-cultivation that are regarded as ‘a way of 
relaunching the politicization of the personal’46 – a means for citizens ‘to carve out for 
themselves new avenues for public action beyond those already prescribed in official 
politics’.47 An example of this is the citizen science environmental sensing project that I 
will later turn to below.  
 
 
The future of the witness: beyond the human  
In the context of contemporary environmental violence, with its roots in colonialism and 
the plantation system, there is an increasing awareness that what is necessary are 
practices of more-than-human ‘world-making’ that entail both human and nonhuman 
planetary subjects.48 Givoni’s witnesses, for all their worth, remain within the realm of 
                                                
41 See Adrian Lahoud, ‘Floating Bodies’ in Forensis, 495–518. 
42 See for instance Martin Lukacs, ‘Neoliberalism has conned us into fighting climate change as 
individuals’, Guardian, 17 July 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/true-
north/2017/jul/17/neoliberalism-has-conned-us-into-fighting-climate-change-as-individuals.  
43 Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 25. 
44 Michel Feher, ‘Self-Appreciation; or, The Aspirations of Human Capital’, Public Culture, vol. 21, 
no. 1 (2009): 21–41, at 21. Cited in Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 26. 
45 Feher, ‘The Governed in Politics’, 38, cited in Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 26. 
46 Feher, ‘The Governed in Politics’, 38, cited in Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 26. 
47 Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 20. 
48 Many have made strong claims for the Anthropocene (the period during which human activity 
has been the dominant influence on climate and the environment) needing to be understood 
through the colonial plantation system (hence Donna Haraway’s term ‘Plantationocene’). See  
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the humanitarian, tasked with rescuing a certain ‘humanity’ faced with ‘inhuman’ 
horrors.49 Thus the question remains as to how the more-than-human (for instance, 
animals, plants, landscapes) might figure within this constellation. Before turning to this, 
let us linger a while on the temporality of witnessing.  
 
As mentioned above, in the context of environmental violence, what must be borne 
witness to is  not something that has occurred in the past; rather, it is often a present, 
ongoing condition that spills out into the future and, in the context of the threat of 
Anthropocenic extinction and exhaustion, makes itself felt pre-emptively in the present.50 
And besides this temporal expansion is also the question of perceptibility. If Givoni’s 
concern is to ‘critically examine the applicability of the poststructuralist concept of 
witnessing to contemporary catastrophes’ and to ask the question of what it means ‘[t]o 
be a witness to emergencies’,51 we might ask: how to bear witness to a ‘catastrophe’ or 
‘emergency’ when it remains largely imperceptible (on whose scale does an ‘emergency’ 
register?), and when the emergency itself is the slow cancellation of the future? Of a 
liveable and ‘sustainable’ environment? In other words, the slow collapse of an ecosystem, 
a set of bodies, suspended between the past, present and a looming, suffocating future; 
the in many cases quite literal annulment of a world, a future.  
 
Here I turn to Rob Nixon’s Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (2011), which 
I propose we re-read from the perspective of witnessing.52 What Nixon terms ‘slow 
violence’ escapes the spectacle-driven corporate media and our flickering attention 
spans.53 Typically not even perceived as violence, slow violence is not time-bound or 
body-bound, but rather is attritional and of delayed effects.54 Most often environmental 
                                                                                                                                      
Donna Haraway, ‘Anthropocene, Capitolocene, Plantationocene, Chthulucene: Making Kin’, 
Environmental Humanities, vol. 6 (2015), 159–165; Vergès, ‘Racial Capitalocene’, Gray and Sheikh, 
‘The Wretched Earth’.  
49 See Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 213. 
50 The threat of ‘Day Zero’ of the Cape Town water ‘crisis’ in early 2018 can be read through this 
temporal logic.  
51 Givoni, The Care of the Witness, 203. 
52 Nixon himself rarely uses the terms ‘witnessing’ or ‘testimony’. 
53 This parsing of slow violence is taken from my entry on ‘Violence’ in The Posthuman Glossary, 
ed. Rosi Braidotti and Maria Hlavajova (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), 448–52.  
Against the backdrop of the unprecedented fires, floods and heat waves across the globe during 
2018, see Nixon’s interview with Amy Goodman about slow violence: ‘Rob Nixon: Gov’t 
Inaction on Climate Change Is “Slow Violence” That Hits World’s Poor the Hardest’, Democracy 
Now! 2 August 2018, 
https://www.democracynow.org/2018/8/2/rob_nixon_govt_inaction_on_climate. 
54 Nixon, Slow Violence, 3, 11.  
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and with everything to do with the ‘violent geographies of fast capitalism’,55 including 
racism, this insidious violence elides the narrative closure of recognisable visuals of the 
victory and defeat of war, instead working its way inwards, ‘somatized into cellular 
dramas of mutation that – particularly in the bodies of the poor – remain largely 
unobserved, undiagnosed, and untreated.’56 Here, violence must be re-thought in the 
absence of a punctual act, a violent event57  – without a recognisable ‘disaster’ or 
‘emergency’. Slow violence is un-capturable: an event that spills over into the future, yet 
to fully run its course. 
 
Nixon reminds us that many ‘humanitarian’ disasters are catalysed by human-induced 
climate change and by the indifference or denial of North American environmentalism to 
its imperial legacies and contemporary imperial epistemological and extractive violences. 
Here, the calamitous repercussions of the ‘disaster’ play out across a range of temporal 
scales, their invisibility thus posing a range of representational, narrative and strategic 
challenges that resonate with the ‘missing’ as ‘overlooked’ or ‘silenced’.58 How, then, to 
create stories and narratives that are ‘dramatic enough to rouse public sentiment and 
warrant political intervention’?59 What Nixon calls ‘testimonial protest’ would involve 
both ‘scientific and imaginative testimony’, with Nixon’s emphasis being placed on the 
latter; here, the witness is the writer-activist, called upon to draw from literature’s 
‘testimonial and imaginative capacities’ to offer ‘a different kind of witnessing: of sights 
unseen’.60 While my interest in what follows will be the manner in which definition might 
be provided by both human and nonhumans, the potential reconceptualization of the 
witness figure that I am working towards necessitates first of all ‘laying bare’ certain 
epistemological and ontological biases that are remnants of the colonial conquest of 
nature and the category of race.  
 
Nature represents itself  
For Green, one reason why an environmental public has been unable to gather in South 
Africa is a lack of attention (a blindness, perhaps) to ‘the ways in which the logics of 
                                                
55 Michael Watts, Struggles over Geography: Violence, Freedom, and Development (Heidelberg, Germany: 
Dept. of Geography, University of Heidelberg, 2000), 8; cited in Nixon, Slow Violence, 7–8. 
56 Nixon, Slow Violence, 6.  
57 Lahoud, ‘Floating Bodies’, 496.  
58 See Nixon, Slow Violence, 13. 
59 Nixon, Slow Violence, 3. 
60 Nixon, Slow Violence, 6, 14, 32, 15.  
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coloniality and race continue to inform the idea of nature in South Africa.’61 It is here 
that the decolonial thinking developed primarily in Latin America, as well as the 
posthumanities, can be mobilised to inform environmental management and 
conservation science. Epistemologically and ontologically, modernity, as underpinned by 
coloniality, generated and continues to generate categories of race and nature through, 
precisely, its conception of subjects and objects: ‘[T]he nature-culture divide is one of the 
founding dualisms of modernist thought, and it is grounded in the division of subjects 
from objects. […] crucially, the collision of nature and object finds its outworking in 
racism, for race reduces people to objects via the language of biology and species. […] 
racism naturalizes the idea of race’ and ‘turns it into nature’.62 Drawing from Nelson 
Maldonado-Torres’s critique of modernity in Against War: Views from the Underside of 
Modernity (2008), which engages with modernist thought’s practice of turning some into 
subjects and others into objects, Green stresses how Western modernity has yet to 
overcome ‘the legacy of dehumanisation that shaped colonialism and racism’.63 As Rafi 
Youatt notes in the context of international politics and the question of who or what can 
be seen as political actor (or political subject), the making of humanity as a category takes 
place across lines of race, coloniality, migrants and borders, war, humanitarianism and 
commodities.64 ‘Who counts as human at any political moment is itself a byproduct of 
political life.’65 
 
Moreover, if the public, specifically the polis, is commonly associated with the human, 
then the anthropocentrism that is at the heart of colonial and modernist conceptions of 
politics is yet another blind spot – another form of ‘missingness’.  AFor all its attention 
                                                
61 Green, ‘Environmental Publics’, 5. 
62 Green, ‘Environmental Publics’, 6. Decolonial feminist María Lugones shows how the 
modernity/coloniality relation must be understood as fundamentally shaped by race, gender, and 
sexuality; postcolonial and feminist studies of science show how the production of such 
categories went hand in hand with the categorization of different forms of life and knowledge in 
colonial science, particularly the natural sciences, including botanical taxonomy and 
bioprospecting. See María Lugones, ‘Heterosexualism and the Colonial/Modern Gender System’, 
Hypatia 22 (1) (2007): 186–209; Jason Irving, ‘Decentering European Medicine: The Colonial 
Context of the Early History of Botany and Medicinal Plants’ in Sheikh and Orlow, eds., 
Theatrum Botanicum, 129–36; and Sita Balani, ‘From Botany to Community: A Legacy of 
Classification’ in Theatrum Botanicum, 229–35. 
63 Green, ‘Environmental Publics’, 6. 
64 Rafi Youatt, ‘Anthropocentrism and the Politics of the Living’ in Reflections on the Posthuman in 
International Relations: The Anthropocene, Security and Ecology, ed. Clara Eroukhmanoff and Matt 
Harker (Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2015), 39–49, at 43.  
65 Rafi Youatt, ‘Interspecies Relations, International Relations: Rethinking Anthropocentric 
Politics’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 43, no. 1 (2014): 207–23, at 207 (see also 
213–14). 
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to the environment and the conjunction between violations carried out against both 
human and nonhuman life, Nixon’s book remains caught within the task of the decidedly 
human writer-activist, and rendering slow violence legible or intelligible to human 
sensibilities.66 This is not to criticize Nixon’s vastly important book, which has done 
much to change the discourse within environmental activism and the environmental 
humanities – and in fact to create, together with notable others, the field that we might 
now retrospectively name ‘postcolonial environmental humanities’),67 but rather to signal 
to and inhabit the uncomfortable aporias of representation that writer-activists face. On 
the one hand, as mentioned above in the context of nonhuman rights, ‘speaking for’ or 
‘giving voice’ to nature runs the risk of anthropocentrism. Likewise, as Astrida Neimanis 
writes, the warnings posed by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in her seminal 1988 essay, 
‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, prove as prescient as ever, albeit relating to different forms 
of ‘subaltern’. 68  In this case, we now see the dangers of ‘speaking for’ and 
misrepresenting not only indigenous subjects but also nature.69  
 
As Spivak had famously asserted in her essay, attempts to represent (to speak of or for) 
the subaltern (in the context of her essay, the Indian woman, or the third-world subject 
more broadly) are often predicated upon an ‘epistemic violence’ that ‘[constitutes] the 
colonial subject as Other’.70 Just as Nixon’s Slow Violence is a reminder of the role of 
imperialism in creating the conditions of slow violence in the now global south, Spivak’s 
essay points to the blindness of Western (notably French), poststructuralist thinking 
regarding the implications of imperialism in this epistemic violence. Furthermore, this is 
despite the proliferation of attempts to decentre the sovereign subject within 
poststructuralism. In other words, simply put, to destabilize the subject as the sovereign 
agent of intentional acts on the one hand, and as a transparent, fully legible and un-
                                                
66 Nixon, Slow Violence, 15. 
67 For a list of notable references within the field of postcolonial environmental humanities, see 
Gray and Sheikh, ‘The Wretched Earth’, 1–2. A starting point here would be Rob Nixon, 
‘Environmentalism and Postcolonialism’ in Postcolonial Studies and Beyond, ed. Ania Loomba et al 
(Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2005), 233–251.  
68 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ in Cary Nelson and Lawrence 
Grossberg, eds., Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 
1988), 271–313. 
69 Astrida Neimanis, ‘No Representation without Colonisation? (Or, Nature Represents Itself)’, 
Somatechnics, 5 (2) (2015): 135–53. I have previously touched upon these points from Neimanis’s 
essay in Shela Sheikh, ‘Translating Geontologies’ in James Graham, ed., And Now: Architecture 
Against a Developer Presidency: Essays on the Occasion of Trump’s Inauguration (New York: Columbia 
Books on Architecture and the City, 2017), 165–84. 
70 Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, 280–81. 
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differentiated object of knowledge on the other.71 As Neimanis stresses, the conundrum 
remains as to whether any form of representation (be this of humans or non-humans), 
however well-intentioned, necessarily involves at least some form of colonization: a 
rendering passive or mute, a silencing or secondary ‘missingness’. Representation, 
especially in defence of the rights of nature, remains an ‘impossible necessity’ – an 
experience of being trapped between ‘a representationalist rock and a hard place of 
complicit silence.’72 
 
Practically speaking, there are various manners through which we might think this ‘can’t 
yet must’ paradox or ‘impossible necessities’ of representing non-humans, to use 
Neimanis’s phrases.73  To be clear, Spivak does not suggest that we do away with 
representation altogether, and in the context of environmental violence this is also not an 
option. However, representation remains fraught; in Rosalind Morris’s parsing, ‘the 
subaltern (as woman) at the centre of Spivak’s essay describes a relation between subject 
and object status (under imperialism and then globalization) that is not one of silence – 
to be overcome by representational heroism – but aporia. The one cannot be “brought” 
into the other.’74 In the context of nature, I am not suggesting here that nature be 
‘retrieved’ and ushered into the category of subject; rather, that we remain attentive to 
the possible mechanisms of missingness between the two sense of representation that 
Spivak reminds us of: ‘representation’ as vertreten (the art of persuasion or rhetoric, as 
political proxy) and darstellung (tropology, or representation as portrait).75  
 
In the context of Forensic Architecture, for instance, through the use of persuasion or 
rhetorical skill, the ‘testimony’ of the inanimate is ‘ventriloquized’ or interpreted in 
various forums (legal, political and/or cultural) in the context of constructing ‘public 
                                                
71 In the easy claims made by some western intellectuals that the oppressed are able to ‘speak for 
themselves’, the paradox is that the category of the sovereign subject is restored precisely within 
the theory that sets out to question it. Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, 278. 
72 Neimanis, ‘No Representation without Colonisation?, 136.  
73 Neimanis, ‘No Representation without Colonisation?’, 137. 
74 Rosalind C. Morris, ‘Introduction’ in Rosalind C. Morris, ed., Can the Subaltern Speak?: Reflections 
on the History of an Idea (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010), 1–18, at 13. 
75 Both German words are translatable as ‘representation’, and Spivak makes much of 
Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze’s sliding over the contrast between the two in their 
readings of Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire, where he writes that the small peasant 
proprietors ‘cannot represent themselves’ (he uses vertreten in the original) (275–76). 
Spivak’s point is that ‘the shifting distinctions between representation within the state 
and political economy, on the one hand, and within the theory of the Subject, on the 
other, must not be obliterated.’ Spivak, ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’, 275–76. 
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truth’.76 This narration, as a form of advocacy or ‘speaking for’, ‘resembles what the 
Roman rhetorician Quintilian called prosopopeia – the mediated speech of inanimate 
objects.’77 But ‘nature’ does in fact represent itself. For a start, we know from that nature 
– for instance, vegetal life (plants, trees) – has highly complex means of 
communication.78 Neimanis speaks of nature’s capacity to ‘write itself’, which I suggest 
we translate into the schema of testimony; she looks to ice and water’s capacity to 
materially register traces, and as such ‘to destabilise any rigid boundary between nature 
and culture – one as passive, inert matter there to be consumed and rendered 
transparent; the other the consumer, the renderer.’79 As Schuppli’s work on the ‘material 
witness’ shows, environments themselves are expressive: polluted environments, for 
instance, contain vast photosensitive surfaces that register and record the changes caused 
by modern industrialization.80 This can be mobilized by the practice of forensis, in which 
such traces are ‘read’ and narrated by the (expert or non-expert) witness (here the testis) in 
the quest for accountability and exposure.81 Recognition of nature’s capacity to represent 
itself – i.e., as witness-as-superstes, rather than testis, in the sense of aesthetic representation 
(darstellen) – is also one element of a new politics (i.e., political representation as proxy, 
vertreten).82 As architect Godofredo Pereira writes:  
…it is often left to the side that the world is already a sensorium of environmental 
transformations […]. This is evident in how black snow expresses pollution in the 
Artic […]. We require a different attention to the world’s capacity to represent 
itself. This is where techno-science enters: the molecular nature of environmental 
                                                
76 Forensis is Latin for ‘pertaining to the forum’, and it is this original, broader sense of the term, 
prior to the emergence of forensic science, that the group retrieves. See Weizman, ‘Introduction: 
Forensis’. 
77 Weizman, ‘Introduction: Forensis’, 9. ‘Contemporary modes of prosopopoeia animate material 
objects or landscapes by converting them into data and image’ (10).  
78 See for instance, Eduardo Kohn, How Forests Think: Toward an Anthropology Beyond the 
Human (Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 2015); Stefano Mancuso, Brilliant Green: 
The Surprising History and Science of Plant Intelligence (Island Press, 2015).  
79 Astrida Neimanis, ‘Nature Represents Itself: Bibliophilia in a Changing Climate’ in 
What if Culture was Nature all Along?, ed. Vicki Kirby (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2017), 179–98, at 180. 
80 Susan Schuppli, ‘Dirty Pictures’ in Living Earth: Field Notes from the Dark Ecology Project, 2014–
2016 (Amsterdam: Sonic Acts Press, 2016), 189–211.  
81 See for instance, Forensic Architecture in collaboration with SITU Research, ‘Case: 
Guatemala’.  
82 This relationship between the dual senses of representation might be productively read in the 
context of the 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill, which has been addressed by Tavares in the 
context of nonhuman rights and universal jurisdiction (i.e., representation as political 
representation) and by Schuppli in terms of the ‘cinematic capacity of the oil spill’ insofar as the 
mixing of oil and sea produced a specific image regime (i.e., aesthetic representation). See 
Tavares, ‘Nonhuman Rights’; and Schuppli, Nature Represents Itself, 2018, 
http://susanschuppli.com/exhibition/nature-represents-itself/. 
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change has been pushing a different sensibility to material properties, acoustics, 
and chemicals […]. All this has been key to feed the discussion of new problems 
and the constitution of new politics.83 
 
This ‘constitution of new politics’ has been the concern of figures such as Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro or the ‘postrepresentationalist anthropology’ of Anna Tsing or 
Marisol de la Cadena, as well as proponents of actor-network theory such as Bruno 
Latour.84 Rather than remain in the realm of the general, however, let us begin to unravel 
this through a particular practice, and in the specific vocabulary of witnessing – or, as we 
shall see, possible replacements or multispecies synonyms for this term that I have so far 
been prioritising. Here I turn to a project by Jennifer Gabrys, which, although based in 
the putative ‘West’, engages with many key post- and decolonial representational 
quagmires. Gabrys’s work on ‘sensing lichens’ is part of the London-based Citizen Sense 
research project (of which Gabrys is principal investigator), which investigates the 
relationship between technologies and practices of environmental sensing and citizen 
engagement.85 Part of Gabrys’s research concerns ‘bioindication’: ‘a process by which 
environmental pollution registers in the bodies, inhabitations and relations of organisms.’ 
Recalling the temporality of ‘slow violence’, bioindicator organisms ‘express physiological 
or other observable changes that can indicate the accumulation or duration of pollution events – 
or even possible recovery from pollution events.’86 While previous work had focused on 
moss, the project to which I refer here addresses lichens, which ‘are particularly notable 
for their bioindicator characteristics, and are frequently studied for their ability to signal 
air and soil pollution.’87  
 
                                                
83 Pereira, ‘Towards an Environmental Architecture’, e-flux architecture, 20 June 2018,  
https://www.e-flux.com/architecture/positions/205375/towards-an-environmental-
architecture/. 
84 For a useful overview of the literature in deliberative democracy that proposes to extend 
communicative competence to nonhumans, as well as ‘object-oriented democracy’ and ‘material 
politics/participation’ (inspired by actor-network theory), see Lisa Disch, ‘Ecological Democracy 
and the Co-participation of Things’ in Teena Gabrielson, Cheryl Hall, John M. Meyer and David 
Schlosberg, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Environmental Political Theory (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016), 624–41. 
85 ‘Citizen Sensing and Environmental Practice: Assessing Participatory Engagements with 
Environments through Sensor Technologies’ is funded by the European Research Council. See 
https://citizensense.net. 
86 Jennifer Gabrys, ‘Sensing Lichens: From Ecological Microcosms to Environmental Subjects’, 
Third Text 151, 32 (2) (Spring 2018): 350–67, at 356, emphasis added.  
87 Gabrys, ‘Sensing Lichens’, 352. Lichens are particularly interesting insofar as they are not 
actually plants; composed of fungi, alga and/or cyanobacteria, they are amalgams of multiple 
organisms across kingdoms and hence taxonomic categories (352). 
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Gabrys’s article opens up a number of avenues relevant to a potential 
reconceptualization of the witness. Firstly, that of the ‘speech’ of the (no longer simply 
human) witness: rather than mobilise the metaphor of a nature that ‘speaks’ (as is 
common in environmental campaigns, for instance), and rather than use the generally 
human-centred noun ‘witness’, Gabrys instead refers to lichens as ‘bioindicators’, as such 
avoiding anthropomorphising nature or anthropocentrizing the ‘granting’ of rights or 
‘voice’ to nonhuman. In the context of the prosopopeia of ‘forensic speech’ (the ‘mediated 
speech’ of inanimate objects),88 ‘[o]bjects are animated in the process of presentation, 
referred to as if they were human subjects’ (emphasis added), even if those who do the 
animating are not simply humans but also ‘automated or semi-automated technologies of 
detection and imaging’.89 While Schuppli retains the term ‘witness’, albeit prefaced by the 
qualifier ‘material’ (with the caveat that the term ‘witness’ is used rhetorically rather than 
suggesting that material literally is the author of linguistic speech acts), both Schuppli and 
Gabrys prioritise the term ‘expressive’ rather than ‘speech’.90  
 
Secondly, Gabrys’s focus on ‘speculative engagements’ challenges the notion of any 
given organism (as witness or otherwise) as an individual. Drawing from Alfred North 
Whitehead and Isabelle Stengers, ‘speculative’ for Gabrys signals ‘the distributed capacity 
of organisms and environments to generate new modes of encounter together with new 
propositions for ways of being.’ 91  This speculative gesture would entail remaking 
environmental subjects and rethinking political entanglements that challenge the notion 
of both the individual organism and environment. In an eco-political register, Gabrys 
draws on Gilbert Simondon’s concept of individuation, which refers to ‘the ways in 
which entities are in-formed in relation to each other and their milieus. […] This is also to 
say that what constitutes “human” is not a fixed entity, and can shift in relation to 
different articulations, relations and milieus’.92  
 
Thirdly, in her emphasis on lichens as ‘environmental subjects’ (emphasis added) and 
participants in ‘collective communities engaged in multi-species world-making projects’,93 
                                                
88 Weizman, ‘Introduction: Forensis’, 9. 
89 Weizman, ‘Introduction: Forensis’, 10. 
90 Gabrys’s speaks of the expressive capacities of bioindication or ‘expressive organisms’, and 
Schuppli of the ‘expressive quality of matter’. 
91 Gabrys, ‘Sensing Lichens’, 362. 
92 Gabrys, ‘Sensing Lichens’, 362. 
93 Gabrys, ‘Sensing Lichens’, 352. 
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Gabrys provides a useful point of orientation in the abovementioned debates around 
representation and ‘speaking for’, here framed through perspective. In this 
conceptualization and practice of bioindication, humans are not ‘proxy representatives’, 
‘advocates’ or ‘spokespersons’ for natural systems, and the practice of ‘citizen science’ 
alleviates us from the condescension of science as a transparent, ‘expert’ practice. 
Environmental sensing is here approached from a shift in perspective, with the task 
being ‘to consider how these inverted modes […] might open up other approaches to 
environmental conflict by encountering pollution from the point of view of other organisms,’94 
and through their ‘accounts’. Such an approach is now common in a wide range of 
theoretical approaches and practices.95 Yet more importantly for the post- or decolonial 
context, Gabrys argues that ‘bioindication through these multiplying points of view also 
demonstrates how “nature” is not a stable referent.’ Rather, drawing from Eduardo 
Viveiros de Castro’s Cannibal Metaphysics: For a Post-Structuralist Anthropology (2014 [2009]), 
‘nature’ can in fact be understood as ‘a realm where diversity multiples toward a 
“multinaturalism’” where […] organisms might also be approached as persons and as having 
perspectives as persons’.96 It is in this sense that a new politics might begin to take shape.  
 
As bioindicators, lichens are particularly pertinent to the expanded temporal schema of 
witnessing and bearing witness that I am suggesting here. Recalling the discussion above 
regarding how to narrate, visualise or represent environmental violations, the speculative 
gardening practices that Gabrys refers to ‘do not merely “signal” that an event has occurred 
or is occurring’ (i.e., in both the past and present) but also materialise relations and 
processes among and between organisms and ecologies that take place in the process of 
the accumulation (often slow and otherwise invisible) of pollutants, and of changes in 
environments due to extractive or damaging industries.97 As such, ‘bearing witness’ in 
this bioindicative register does not merely entail sensing and indicating but also 
transforming environments in the present and future, across species divides.  
 
                                                
94 Gabrys, ‘Sensing Lichens’, 365, emphasis added. 
95 Gabrys, ‘Sensing Lichens’, 365. Gabrys refers to Tsing’s attention, in The Mushroom at the End of 
the World (2015), to ‘fungal points of view, which might recast encounters with forests, where 
multiple overlooked “participants” begin to have more marked roles in constituting “social 
relations with other beings”’, as well as Eduardo Kohn’s work on the communicative exchanges 
and production of ‘meaning’ between multiple organisms in his How Forests Think: Toward an 
Anthropology Beyond the Human (2013). 
96 Gabrys, ‘Sensing Lichens’, 365, emphasis added.  
97 Gabrys, ‘Sensing Lichens’, 367. 




To conclude, Gabrys’s work with lichens suggests that nonhuman forms of life may (a) 
actively register environmental conditions and form parts of multispecies world-making 
practices, and (b) provide us with alternatives for the representational schemas that, 
however well-intentioned in terms of advocacy, often end up reinforcing an original 
silencing that they seek to correct. Here, the ‘witness’ (or ‘bioindicator’) can be called 
upon to ‘give an account’, but also functions in the productively ambiguous space of 
‘missingness’ insofar as the injury borne witness to is often more qualitative,98 resisting 
quantitative and classificatory capture. This qualitative aspect also extends into forms and 
practices of care, nurturing and world-making that take place across species and 
organism divides. Such a proactive or creative (rather than merely reactive) practices of 
care (rather than simply repair) are useful insofar as they undo or disregard modernist 
and colonial binaries of nature/culture and subject/object that underlie the deleterious 
consequences of extractivist governmentality, whereby nature is conceived as worth 
‘saving’ or protecting only insofar as it is profitable to do so, for the sake of the human 
species.  
 
Furthermore, maintaining the language of the witness, understood through the 
framework provided by Givoni, allows us to keep hold of witnessing as a distinctive 
form of ethics and politics that – more than other forms of activism, advocacy or 
representational practices – entails a practice that at once makes political and empirical 
claims and contests the individualism upon which contemporary neoliberal 
governmentality is premised. This is particularly pertinent in the context of 
environmental violence and the ‘compliance-based environmental management’ that 
Green speaks of, where states often displace responsibility for the work of care and 
repair onto NGOs and civil society. Here, the world-making evoked by Gabrys, which 
has a rich heritage in feminist technoscience, ‘[allows] for certain subjects and relations to 
gain a foothold’.99 Just as ‘humanitarian’ disasters do not concern merely the human but 
instead the conditions that sustain life and enable certain (cultural and ‘natural’) forms of 
life and just as the ‘rights of nature’ are only in part about what we know as ‘nature’, the 
world-making practices that I refer to are formed across species.100 Rather than rights, 
                                                
98 Gabrys, ‘Sensing Lichens’, 358. 
99 Gabrys, ‘Sensing Lichens’, 352. 
100 See Gabrys, ‘Sensing Lichens’, 352.  
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voice or membership of an environmental public being extended or granted to more-
than-humans from a position of anthropocentrism, ‘persons’ – which I am here 
extending to ‘co-witnesses’ – are produced in and by relations between humans and 
nonhumans.101 
                                                
101 See Youatt, ‘Personhood and the Rights of Nature’, 3. 
